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Executive Summary
The UK has one of the oldest and best regarded intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in 
the world. Yet there is little evidence on private returns to patenting for firms operating in the 
UK, and on the incentive effects of patenting in encouraging R&D investment in patenting 
firms. Using available data from the UK innovation survey (known as the Community 
Innovation Survey or CIS) and linked business performance data the report assesses both 
the additional returns firms achieve by patenting, and the effects on R&D spending. 
This report tests an economic model built upon the following intuition.  The monopoly power 
conferred by a patent provides a firm a price premium in new product revenue, thus increasing 
profitability. At the same time this increased profitability also acts as an inducement to 
increase R&D spending by the firm. Using this idea we try to jointly estimate the extent of the 
premium and the inducement to R&D. In this way the research builds and extends work in 
two literature streams, viz. the economic literature on the value of patents and the literature 
on effect of patents on R&D expenditures.  
The analysis uses two approaches derived from Arora et al. (2008) for estimating the patent 
premium. The first approach relates innovation survey data on new product revenues to R&D 
investments and measures of patent effectiveness (self assessed by businesses). It then 
measures the incremental revenue (from new products) earned by a firm that can be attributed 
to patent protection. We term this the revenue patent premium. The second approach 
estimates what we call the profit premium (the additional profitability on account of patent 
protection) and the inducement to invest in R&D due to patent protection by building a model 
of profits generated by innovative products that are patented.
To make the assessment empirically requires estimates of:
• The value of new product / service revenue firms achieve and their R&D expenditure 
(from the innovation survey);
• The effectiveness of patents in exploiting each firms technology in its market (self 
assessed within the innovation survey);
• The ‘propensity to patent’ a term used to capture the proportion of innovations which 
firms choose to patent.  Data on this are currently unavailable for the UK and we were 
forced to rely on imputation from the US CMU surveys to establish a range for the 
patent propensity.  Thus, we could make only broad predictions (within a range) on the 
extent of premium and the inducement for R&D.
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The UK innovation survey data shows support for the theoretical model.  Patent premiums 
for UK are positive, and in the case of larger firms, comparable to the premia demonstrated 
in similar US studies. Furthermore, the prospect of patent protection provides inducement for 
R&D. The extent of the patent premium and inducement to R&D varies by type of firm and 
industrial sector.
There were some variation in estimates when we grouped firms by size and industrial sector. 
The premia estimated, in terms of additional returns to R&D associated with patents, are less 
pronounced for smaller firms, and for firms outside the biotech and pharma industries. In 
computers and equipment, and in instruments, the premium is around half the biotech level. 
The premium and incentive effects appear to apply equally to younger and older firms, 
suggesting the patents can be as great an incentive to new innovators as to established 
businesses.  These broad conclusions suggest that the role and importance of patents varies 
considerably across industries, and a ‘one size fits all’ approach may not be appropriate.
There is also some evidence that the increasing numbers of service businesses in the most 
recent innovation surveys have led to some drop-off in patent premia and incentive effects. 
To the extent that all service firms are not persistent R&D performers this result is unsurprising. 
At present there is insufficient data to look separately at impact by business size and by 
sector at the same time. 
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Introduction
The UK has one of the oldest intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in the world and yet 
policy makers and Intellectual Property Office (IPO) officials would be hard pressed to say 
what exactly the private returns to patenting are for firms operating in the UK. As more and 
more countries around the world embrace stronger IPR regimes, precise estimates of the 
returns to patenting and comparison of these benefits with the costs incurred in the 
enforcement of patents are likely to become important as an evidence base for policy 
evaluation. 
In this report, we argue that patenting allows firms a price premium in new product revenue 
thus increasing profitability. At the same time this increased profitability acts as an inducement 
to R&D expenditures made by the firm. Thus, we contribute to two literature streams viz. the 
literature on the value of patents and the literature on the effect of patents on R&D 
expenditures.
Our analysis employs two approaches derived from Arora et al. (2008) to the estimation of a 
patent premium. The first approach relates Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data on new 
product revenues to R&D investments and measures of patent effectiveness and measures 
the incremental revenue (from new products) earned by a firm that can be attributed to patent 
protection. We term this the revenue patent premium. The second approach estimates the 
profit premium (the additional profitability on account of patent protection) and the inducement 
to invest in R&D due to patent protection by building a model of profits generated by innovative 
products that are patented.
Using the UK CIS data we find support for our theoretical model. Patent premiums are 
positive and the prospect of patent protection provides inducement for R&D. The extent of 
premium and inducement to R&D varies by type of firm and industrial sector - in particular, 
large firms and firms in the pharmaceutical and biotech sector have larger patent premiums.
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Literature review
2.1 Measuring patent value
Arora, Athreye and Huang (2010) identify three mainstream approaches to estimating patent 
value: the market value approach, the patent renewal approach and the inventor survey 
approach.1 The market value approach uses stock market values and the implicit the 
evaluation of the investor of the value of the firm’s tangible and intangible capital stock 
(including patent stocks). The patent renewal approach on the other hand analyses patent 
renewal records and the associated costs of patenting and renewing in order to assess the 
distribution of earnings from patents from the perspective of the patent holder. Although what 
is measured is different we expect these two measures to be related. A valuable patent 
enhances a firm’s profitability. This being the case, stock market investors will also value the 
firm higher than other firms who do not hold the patent. In a perfectly competitive market it 
should be possible to derive one measure from the other.
A key limitation of the renewal method is that the truly valuable patents, which are renewed 
to full term, cannot be accurately valued. Furthermore, the earlier studies did not link patents 
to firms, and therefore, could not relate patent protection to R&D.2 In addition, patent renewal 
studies assume independence across patent values, an assumption at odds with the finding 
that commercially valuable inventions are often protected by a group of related patents. 
Finally, the reported values of patents in the earlier studies are so small as to be inconsistent 
with the legal and administrative costs of obtaining patents although more recent studies 
(e.g., Deng, 2007) do report higher values.
The inventor survey approach is very different from the market value and patent renewal 
approaches in that it represents a subjective evaluation (by the inventor) of the value of his/
her invention. The great merit of this approach has been to provide data on how patents are 
used. For instance, these surveys show that a very substantial proportion of patents held by 
large firms are actually ‘blocking’ patents. At the same time these data show that smaller 
firms have a greater propensity to license patents that they take out. So the real challenge of 
the patent system is how to make it work for smaller firms and universities and thereby derive 
greater social value.
1 Their review found that 35 of 47 papers used one of these three methodologies. The Market value approach 
is the oldest and 19 papers used this methodology or a variant of it. There were 11 studies that used the 
patent renewal approach and 5 relatively recent studies have used the Inventor survey approach. See Arora, 
Athreye and Huang (2010) for further details.
2 Schankerman (1988) did use estimates of patent value from French data to infer that the implicit subsidy to 
R&D from patent protection amounted to 25% of R&D, which is related to the notion of a patent premium. 
However, to guide policy, one must understand not only the value of patent protection but also how R&D 
investments would change in response to changes in patent protection.
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Though the estimates of patent value obtained through the three methods are comparable in 
principle, they vary greatly in scale. Arora, Athreye and Huang (2010) note there is in fact a 
wide discrepancy in estimates of returns to a patent as measured under the three main 
approaches. Studies using the renewal approach find the smallest returns to patenting, 
ranging from thousands to tens of thousands of US dollars; the value estimated by market 
value approach is around hundreds of thousands of US dollars; and the inventor survey 
approach has the largest point estimates of patent value at over a million US dollars. It 
should be pointed out that the inventor surveys typically focus on “important” patents. For 
instance, the Patval survey focused on “triadic” patents: inventions for which patents were 
filed in the US, Japan and Europe.
Studies that focus on the value of patenting for UK firms are sparse. Using the patent renewal 
approach and based on an analysis of patents filed between 1950-79, Pakes (1986) and 
Schankerman and Pakes (1986) reported median estimates of UK patent value (in US$2005) 
are $3,897 per patent while mean values are $14,580 per patent. The PatVal survey included 
data on 1542 patent applications by UK inventors to the EPO distributed across 29 technology 
classes. Over 40% of all patents reported a value of between 100 and1000 million euros. The 
dominant technology classes in terms of value are chemical and petrol; basic materials 
chemistry; macromolecular chemistry & polymers; analysis, measurement & control 
technology; nuclear engineering; machine tools and pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. 
A striking feature of the PatVal data for the UK is that 12 patent applications accounted for 
very high values – together they amounted to roughly 36-42% of all value. These 12 values 
may of course be outliers of some sort but it is worth noting a similar finding in the Bloom and 
Van Reenan (2000) study which used the market value approach. The authors also noted 
that 12 firms accounted for 72% of the UK patent count held at the United States Patent and 
Trade Mark Office (USPTO).
While all three approaches to deriving patent value emphasise the positive returns from 
patenting and the differences in these returns across technological sectors, they do not 
directly model the fact that patenting allows the inventor/inventing firm to charge higher 
prices for the patented innovation, and this by itself can result in higher revenues and profits. 
2.2 Patent protection and the inducement for R&D
Although the prospect of greater exclusivity in the market (due to patent protection) should 
induce investment in innovation, the literature on the inducement for R&D that patent 
protection provides has yielded mixed findings.  
Horstmann et al. (1985) argue that the costs of disclosure that patents require may offset the 
prospective gains (cf. Further, the effect of “stronger” patents on firms’ incentives to innovate 
is not obvious since “stronger” patents may mean that rivals will also benefit (cf. Jaffe 2000; 
Gallini 2002). Moreover, when innovations build upon earlier ones, Merges and Nelson 
(1990) and Scotchmer (1991) argue that broad patents may slow the rate of technical change.
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Prior empirical work(largely survey-based) has often found patents to be of limited importance 
(c.f., Scherer et al. 1959; Taylor and Silberston, 1973). Mansfield (1986), based on a survey 
of 100 respondents for 1981-83, found that other than pharmaceutical and chemicals firms 
only a few inventions would not have been developed in the absence of patents. On the other 
hand, Cockburn and Henderson (2003), based on a survey of IP managers from 66 leading 
firms in the US, report that well over half of their respondents agreed with the statement that 
their R&D spending would significantly decline without patent protection. 
Levin et al. (1987) and, more recently, Cohen et al. (2000), do not directly ask about the 
impact on R&D, but do report that in most industries patents are viewed as less important in 
protecting rents from innovation than first mover advantages or secrecy. Indeed Moser (2005) 
analyses invention records from two World’s Fairs in the second half of the 19th century, and 
finds that in those industries where patent protection was not readily available, inventors 
tended to focus their effort on technologies where other means of protection were available. 
However, though patents may be less important than first mover advantage, it is patents that 
are the subject of public policy, not first mover advantage. Moreover, patents do not preclude 
first mover advantage (though they might compromise secrecy), and thus it is important to 
understand the incentives that patent protection provides for R&D. 
A similar mixed picture emerges from the econometric findings reported in the literature. 
Studies using aggregate cross-national data have found a positive and significant effect 
(Eaton and Kortum 1999, Kanwar and Evenson 2003, and Lederman and Maloney 2003). On 
the other hand, based on his examination of the impact of 177 policy changes on innovation 
over 150 years, across sixty countries, Lerner (2002) concludes that strengthening patent 
protection does not seem to encourage patenting by domestic firms. 
A key problem is that national level patent policy changes may be measured very coarsely. 
Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) exploit the change in patent policy in Japan allowing 
patents with multiple claims (which they interpret as a reduction in the cost of patenting) and 
find only a small positive effect of on R&D investments. However, since building productive 
R&D programmes can take time, enhanced patent protection may not result in an immediate 
increase in R&D investment.
2.3 Approach followed in this report
We rely upon differences in reported patent effectiveness, matched to the R&D investments 
firms made and the profits they reported to identify the effect of patent protection on profits 
and the inducement for R&D. To tie them together, we develop a simple structural model that 
allows us to estimate jointly the relationship between patent protection and profitability as 
well as that between R&D investments and patent protection. In this sense, our paper touches 
on the literature linking R&D to patent production by firms (e.g. Pakes and Griliches, 1984). 
We do not estimate a patent (or innovation) production function, although one is implicit in 
our equation linking profits to R&D and patent effectiveness. 
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Our model builds upon the framework developed in Arora, Ceccagnoli and Cohen (2008), in 
that they too estimate a structural model where patent effectiveness is reflected in R&D 
investments. However, there are two important differences, which arise from differences in 
the available data. First, they observe the share of product innovations for which the 
responding firm had sought patent protection. This measure allows them to relate patent 
effectiveness directly to patenting propensity. This is significant because patent protection 
ought to matter for profits only to the extent that the firm patents. Firms with only a small 
share of innovations protected by patents must derive less benefit from them than firms that 
patent a larger share of their innovations. For this reason, the share of innovations patented 
is also directly informative about how valuable patent protection is to the firm, and by 
extension, how patent protection will encourage the firm to invest in R&D. 
The CIS does not ask about the share of innovations protected by patents. However, we are 
able to obtain a direct measure of profits. Thus, unlike Arora et al. (2008), who must rely only 
on the relationship between patents and R&D to infer the value of patent protection, we are 
able to estimate this relationship directly, in addition to estimating the relationship between 
patent effectiveness and R&D. In addition, we use the results reported in Arora et al. (2008) 
to develop an estimate of how patent propensity varies with changes in patent effectiveness. 
Assuming that a similar relationship holds for UK firms allows us to estimate both the 
increment to profits due to patent protection, as well as the inducement to R&D from patent 
protection. 
3. Patents, profits and the inducement for R&D - two models
Two main ideas underpin our structural models developed in the sections below. The first is 
that the monopoly power conferred by a patent allows the inventor/firm to charge a higher 
price for the new products developed through innovation.   Secondly, we think about R&D as 
the cost of innovation and innovation as the outcome of R&D. This idea is integral to any 
argument that links patenting with higher R&D. If patenting increases the returns from 
innovation, then firms undertaking innovation will factor these returns into their decisions 
about R&D outlay. 
3.1 New product revenue (NPR) and the patent revenue premium
Patents increase the revenue that a new product will earn (relative to without a patent). Let 
this increment in revenue δ be termed the patent revenue premium. New product revenue 
from innovation thus depends upon two factors: the extent of the patent premium and the 
percentage of new products that are patented (patent propensity). Patent propensity multiplies 
the patent premium because the benefits of patent protection accrue only to patented 
products. Thus, the greater the share of products that are patented (i.e, the greater is the 
patent propensity), the greater the impact on revenues of any given level of patent protection. 
As we know innovation can take the form of process innovations (which improve productivity) 
and product innovation where pricing plays a more direct role in generating higher revenues 
and profitability. Thus, this part of our analysis has little to say about process innovation 
unless that also resulted in new product development. 
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Following Arora et al. (2008), we specify a model (derived in appendix A) that relates the log of 
new product revenue (npri) to the log of in-house R&D expenditures (Ri), characteristics of the 
firm (represented by Zi), and finally, the patent premium δ multiplied by patent propensity, Фi: 
npri = A + b1 ln(Ri) + ln(1 + δФi) + b3Zi + εi      (1) 
However, unlike the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) data used in the Arora et al(2008) 
paper, which report the total number of innovations and the proportion that are patented 
(hereafter the patent propensity), the CIS asks firms only if they innovated and how much 
they earned from innovation. In other words, CIS does not report the proportion of innovations 
that is patented. 
To estimate the model, we therefore assume a linear relationship between perceived patent 
effectiveness, xi, and patent propensity (Φi). Specifically, we assume that 
Φi = a1x1i, a1>0           (2)
where x1 is perceived patent effectiveness of the reporting unit, scaled from 0 to 3. 
Assuming ln(1 + δΦi) can be approximated as δΦi,we can rewrite (1) as 
npri = A + B1ln(Ri) + B2 x + B3Zi +e       (3)
where 
B2= a1δ, or δ = B2 / a1         (4) 
As we have no measure for Фi, we estimate the compound coefficient a1δ. At different levels 
of a1, we can infer the implied patent premium δ. 
3.2 Profits, the patent premium and the inducement for R&D
The second method uses a different definition and estimates of the patent premium, using 
the accounting data on profits (gross operating surplus) as a dependent variable. The intuition 
behind this model is that firms invest in R&D in order to generate innovations. If patent 
protection is strong then firms might respond by patenting a larger proportion of their 
innovations. This increases profitability from innovation because patented innovations earn 
a higher profit per unit – this is formalised in equation (6) below. At the same time, higher 
profits from innovations will stimulate spending on innovation and thus act as a stimulus for 
R&D - this is formalised in equation (7) below.
We can write total profits of a firm i as (we suppress the firm subscript for convenience):
Y - R = Qπ(R)(1-f + (1+γ)Ф) – R        (5)
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where Y = profits gross of R&D expenses, π(R) is the profit per unit of output in the absence 
of patent protection (in essence, equal to the average price cost margin), and Q is the total 
output. As before, Φ is the share of the focal firm’s products and services that are covered by 
patents and 1+γ is the patent premium, which, unlike in model 1, is defined as the incremental 
profits from all products and services due to patent protection. We assume that Π(R) is linear 
in logs, i.e. it is a Cobb-Douglas function.  Assuming firms choose their R&D investments to 
maximise returns, so that actual profits and R&D are jointly determined by underlying firm 
and industry characteristics (denoted by X), the estimating equations become:
LnR = C1 + ΣXj λj + β Ln(1+ Φγ)        (6)
LnY = C2 + ΣXj θj + (α)LnR + Ln(1+ Φγ)       (7)
where λj = βθj and β =1/(1-α), i.e. cross equation constraints derived in Appendix A, and 
where C1 , C2 are vectors of intercept terms in equations (6) and (7) respectively, λj is a vector 
of unknown coefficients of the exogenous variables in equation (6), θj is a vector of unknown 
coefficients of the exogenous variables in equation (7), Xi is a vector of exogenous variables 
(controls) in both equations; Rj is in-house R&D expenditure. In order to estimate this system, 
we need an “instrument” for R&D, i.e. a variable that affects R&D but does not directly affect 
profits. We use lagged values of R&D for this purpose. 
As before, we do not observe patent propensity Φ and therefore posit that it is a function of 
reported patent effectiveness, x1, as given in (2).  The system of equations to be estimated is:
LnR = C1 + ΣXj λj + β Ln(1+ a1 x1 γ)        (6’)
Ln Y = C2 + ΣXj θj + (α)LnR + Ln(1+ a1 x1 γ)       (7’)
subject to λj = βθj and β =1/(1-α) ; where x1 is patent effectiveness of the reporting unit, scaled 
from 0 to 3; 
Note that (7) is very similar to (1). However, by estimating (6) and (7) together we accomplish 
two objectives. Firstly, we improve the efficiency of the estimate, because parameters are 
shared between the two equations. Secondly, because we have linearised the model for 
estimation, we are able to estimate the implied elasticity of R&D due to patent protection (ER) 
by computing the product β (a1 γ).
3
Please see Appendix A for the formal derivation of the two equations. 
3 For a non-linear model, ER would not be constant.  Instead it would be calculated for the three ranges of patent 
effectiveness (x1) viz. 0-1, 1-2 and 2-3 as:
 For x1 from 0-1: ER = b [ln(1+ 1 a1 g) - ln(1+ 0 a1 g)] = b [ln(1+ 1 a1 g)]    (8)
 For x1 from 1-2: ER = b [ln(1+ 2 a1 g) - ln(1+ 1 a1 g)]      (8’)
 For x1 from 2-3: ER = b [ln(1+ 3 a1 g) - ln(1+ 2 a1 g)]        (8’’)
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4. Data sources, variable description and econometric issues
We exploited the availability of matched micro-data at reporting unit level at the Virtual Micro 
Laboratory of the ONS to estimate the two structural models. In our analysis we drew upon 
data in the CIS, the profits data in the Annual Respondent Database (ARD) and the R&D data 
in the Business Enterprise Research and Development (BERD) surveys.4
Our main data source was the CIS. We used the CIS data for information on business 
characteristics, such as the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) of the reporting unit, 
employment and employees, turnover, enterprise group links, and the turnover generated by 
new products, innovators and non-innovators, and on types of aggregate innovative 
expenditures and perceptions of patent effectiveness. 
The CIS is a voluntary postal survey carried out by ONS. For the survey, the ONS randomly 
selects a stratified sample of firms with more than 10 employees, drawn from the Inter-
Departmental Business Register (IDBR) by SIC92 two-digit class and 8 employment size 
bands. ONS surveys tend to account for the majority of large sized businesses (for these have 
a greater economic impact), and then select a number of small and medium sized businesses 
sampled by industry and geographical region. To date there have been 5 rounds of CIS in the 
UK but in this report we only include data for CIS3, 4 and 5. The panel element of the CIS data 
sets is small except for the most recent CIS5 & 6 when large firms have been re-sampled.
CIS3 covers the period 1998-2000 and had 8,172 responses (a response rate of 42%). The 
survey covers both the production sectors (manufacturing, mining, electricity, gas and water, 
construction) and the service sectors. The retail sector has been excluded from the survey as 
this one has been a poor responder in previous surveys and, generally, has shown very little 
innovation. CIS4 covers the period 1998-2000 and is a larger survey than its predecessor. It 
was sent to 28,000 UK enterprises with a 58% response rate. The CIS4 survey also included 
the following sectors: sale, maintenance & repair of motor vehicles;  retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants, which had not been included in CIS3. This was a new set of sectors due to the 
increase in the sampling size and better coverage. The latest CIS surveys were undertaken in 
2007 (CIS5) and 2009 (CIS6). We included CIS5, as its sampling frame was quite similar to 
that of CIS4 and the coverage of questions was similar. We excluded CIS6 as it did not have a 
comparable question on patent effectiveness which was crucial for our analysis.
We estimate the structural models detailed in the previous section separately for the CIS3, 4 
and 5 rounds because only a few firms feature in more than one panel. We imported the gross 
operating surplus (GOS) for reporting units in the CIS from the ARD database to estimate 
Model 2. Since the ARD data are annual data we took period averages to match the CIS 
variables. For example, the average GOS over 1997-2000 was used with CIS3 variables to 
estimate model 2 for the CIS3 wave of firms. We were able to match 4276 observations in CIS3 
to ARD, 8700 observations in CIS4 and 4551 observations for CIS5. Table 1 below shows, for 
both models, the list of variables used, the source of data for each variable and the way the 
variable was constructed. 
4  The Stata files used for matching the datasets are available from the author on request.
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R&D expenditures (R) are endogenous in our model because R&D expenditures will depend 
upon unobserved firm specific differences in price and quantity. Put differently, demand 
shocks (which affect p and q) will also affect R. This can be easily seen by writing p = mp+ e, 
where mp is the average (across firms) price and e is a firm-specific component of price. All 
else being equal, the higher the value of e, the higher will be the value of R. Endogeneity of 
parameters creates a bias in the value of the estimated parameter. One solution is to 
instrument for R. 
We instrument for in-house R&D expenditure in the innovation equation using fourth lagged 
value of R&D (using the third lagged value of R&D expenditure if the fourth lag is not 
available).  R&D expenditure data were taken from the BERD surveys.  We could have used 
R&D expenditure form the CIS which reports R&D expenditures at the responding unit level 
(or establishment level). Our reasoning was that in many firms, R&D is centralized at the firm 
level, with individual business units drawing upon the new knowledge created. This is 
especially true for research rather than development, which may be decentralized to a greater 
extent. Moreover, the extent to which the relevant R&D is conducted by the business unit 
varies across firms. 
Using the BERD data to instrument R&D is also a consequence of the limited panel nature of 
the CIS. The BERD survey matches the CIS poorly and greatly reduced the number of firms 
from the CIS survey that we are able to use in estimation. More importantly, it also changes 
the sample properties (See Table 2 below). The instrumented sample consists of persistent 
R&D performers and contains a greater proportion of larger firms than the original CIS 
sample. 
We experimented with other instruments for in-house R&D expenditure, such as ‘co-operation 
with overseas universities or other higher education institutions overseas’ and ‘proportion of 
enterprise’s employees educated to degree level in science and engineering using the CIS 
questionnaire itself. However, it is likely that these variables are themselves determined by 
similar unobserved factors that determine R&D. Accordingly we do not feature those results. 
Lastly, we note both our models are non-linear. We linearise the equation (1) by assuming 
that ln(1 + δΦi) ~ δΦi and estimate both an OLS and a 2SLS version of the model. However, 
in the case of equation (6) and (7) (Model 2) we report the estimates based on GMM 
estimation. 
12
Returns to Patenting and the Inducement for R&D
Table 1: Variables used in the study
Variable name Source of the data Measure description and construction
Dependent 
variables
New product revenue (npr) in 
£000
CIS 3, 4 & 5 (q810, 
q2420)
NPR is obtained by multiplying 
firm’s share of products 
introduced that were new to 
firm’s market by the firm’s 
turnover. Measure included 
was ln(1+NPR)
Gross operating surplus 
(GOS) in £000
ARD2
GOS is reported in ARD2 and 
we included ln(1+GOS)
Endogenous 
variable
R&D expenditure (R) in £000 
BERD (mean R&D over 
the years corresponding 
to each CIS wave)
We use the mean R&D 
expenditures corresponding to 
the years covered by each 
CIS. This is 1997-2000 for 
CIS3, 2001-2004 for CIS4 and 
2005-2006 for CIS5. 
We use the transformed 
measure ln (1+R)
Exogenous 
variables
Patent effectiveness (x), 
scale 0-3
CIS 3, 4 & 5 (q2130)
Reported the importance to 
enterprise of patents as a 
method to protect innovations. 
There are four mutually exclusive 
responses (0 - Not used; 1-Low; 
2 - Medium; 3 - High).
Firm size CIS 3, 4 & 5 (q2520)
Natural log of the total number 
of employees
Herfindahl index (HF Index)
from 0-1
BSD (1997-2006)
Defined as the sum of the 
squares of the market shares 
of the reporting units within 
4-digit SIC sectors, where the 
market shares are expressed 
as fractions. High values of the 
HF index denote concentration
Global
CIS 4 & 5 
(q230, q240)
Dummy variable=1 if the 
enterprise sells goods and/or 
services overseas (Other 
Europe and all other countries 
except the UK).
Public BSD (1997-2006)
Dummy variable=1 if the 
enterprise is a publicly traded 
company.
Foreign BSD (1997-2006)
Dummy variable=1 if the 
parent firm is located abroad 
(USA or other).
Cooperation
CIS 3, 4 & 5 
(q1861, q1862, q1871, 
q1872)
Dummy variable=1 if the co-
operation partner (e.g. 
Universities or other higher 
education institutions; 
Government or public 
research institutes) is located 
locally/ regionally within the 
UK or a partner is a UK 
national. Reporting unit level
Instruments for 
R&D 
expenditures
Lagged R&D - R&Dt-4
(in £000)
BERD (1997-2006)
Total intramural (in-house) 
R&D expenditure. We used 
the fourth lagged value of an 
enterprise’s R&D expenditure, 
then computed ln(1+R&Dt-4) 
the natural logarithm.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the CIS and CIS/BERD sample
CIS sample
Sample for which R&D lagged is 
available
CIS 3
Variable 
name
Observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation.
Observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation.
npr, log 6340 1.04 3.31 515 3.33 5.44
npr, % 6451 1.92 10.02 519 5.03 14.84
GOS, 000£ 4276 3750.76 27409.49 410 11727.8 47718.88
GOS, log 4268 6.12 1.84 410 7.50 1.88
X 4276 0.32 0.83 527 1.27 1.32
R, £000
(from CIS)
4276 81.87 1254.95 527 739.22 3158.89
R, £000
(mean R&D, 
BERD)
- - - 527 1883.55 7053.01
R, log 4276 0.45 1.46 527 5.63 1.70
# employees 4248 174.65 447.90 522 426.5 856.03
employees, 
log
4248 4.05 1.39 522 5.18 1.31
Global - - - - - -
Public 4276 0.86 0.35 527 0.99 0.08
Foreign 4276 0.06 0.24 527 0.19 0.39
cooperation 4276 0.04 0.20 527 0.20 0.40
R&D lagged , 
log
- - - 527 5.38 1.85
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CIS 4
npr, log 16085 1.53 3.91 1109 5.04 5.96
npr, % 16090 2.66 10.64 1110 8.29 17.64
GOS, 000£ 8700 8108.18 60214.79 772 14162.05 98760.07
GOS, log 8666 6.49 2.05 772 7.59 1.86
X 8700 0.46 0.93 1111 1.50 1.29
R, £000
(from CIS)
8700 172.07 1834.76 1111 1065.8 4117.72
R, £000
(mean R&D, 
BERD)
- - - 1111 3245.57 22505.1
R, log 8700 1.07 2.03 1111 5.81 1.76
# employees 8698 365.36 1827.86 1110 329.21 671.0
employees, 
log
8698 4.02 2.05 1110 4.72 1.72
Global 8700 0.22 0.41 1111 0.62 0.49
Public 8700 0.87 0.34 1111 0.98 0.13
Foreign 8700 0.12 0.32 1111 0.25 0.43
cooperation 8700 0.07 0.26 1111 0.25 0.43
R&D lagged , 
log
- - - 1111 5.58 1.89
CIS 5
npr, log 4248 3.79 5.39 1205 6.36 5.86
npr, % 4249 5.57 13.86 1205 9.49 18.14
GOS, 000£ 4551 25667.73 72556.64 1232 17037.43 92568.69
GOS, log 4537 7.11 2.14 1232 7.57 2.04
X 4551 0.62 1.07 2608 1.04 1.27
R, £000
(from CIS)
4551 217.26 1987.74 2608 584.66 4892.88
R, £000
(mean R&D, 
BERD)
2608 1844.39 23204.5
R, log 4551 1.22 2.19 2608 4.46 1.94
# employees 4547 504.46 1988.60 2595 256.78 680.21
employees, 
log
4547 4.57 2.06 2595 4.22 1.71
Global 4551 0.25 0.43 2608 0.43 0.49
Public 4551 0.92 0.28 2608 0.93 0.25
Foreign 4551 0.53 0.50 2608 0.54 0.50
cooperation 4551 0.06 0.24 2608 0.13 0.34
R&D lagged, 
log
- - - 1031 5.45 2.00
Note: All variables used in the study are at the reporting unit level
(Source: ONS)
Returns to Patenting and the Inducement for R&D
15
5. Effective patent protection and incomes from innovation - some 
descriptive analysis
IP protection enhances three kinds of potential revenues that firms can earn from their 
innovative activities. Firstly, firms can earn higher revenues and profits from existing products 
protected by IP. Secondly, IP protection may encourage firms to develop and market 
innovative products for which customers are willing to pay more, resulting in higher revenues 
to the firm. Lastly, firms can license their innovations (nationally and internationally) if their 
innovations are adequately backed by patents.
Data from the Community Innovation Surveys allow us to assess how these incomes vary 
according to the perceived effectiveness of patents. Table 3 shows the distribution of revenue 
from products that were new to a firm’s market (NPR) across firms. The period of time covered 
is 1997-2006, which is split up by CIS3 (1997-2000), CIS4 (2001-2004) and CIS5 (2005-
2006) samples. 
Table 3: NPR and patent effectiveness (by CIS samples)
CIS3 CIS4 CIS5
Number of 
reporting 
units
Mean, 
mill. £ 
standard 
deviation, 
mill. £
Number 
of 
reporting 
units
Mean, 
mill. £
standard 
deviation, 
mill. £
Number 
of 
reporting 
units
Mean, 
mill. £
Standard 
deviation 
mill. £
Patents not 
used
5425 47.50 1095.35 12833 94.48 4935.42 2951 61.93 636.26
The 
importance 
of patents 
is low
248 169.04 1339.10 1179 241.53 3935.35 404 256.32 1123.97
The 
importance 
of patents 
is medium
261 108.09 4510.79 923 776.62 10000.60 273 400.22 1758.30
The 
importance 
of patents 
is high
404 228.77 1040.78 1148 451.03 3730.84 618 1539.45 9706.62
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Our table shows that a majority of CIS respondents said they did not use patent protection 
but some of these respondents appear to have reported some NPR. The mean of NPR is 
clearly higher for the firms which used patents, with the highest values reported by those who 
rate patent protection importance as medium (CIS4) or high (CIS3 and CIS5). This provides 
some initial evidence that price premiums due to patenting may be important in the UK 
economy. The large standard deviations however point to a high variability possibly due to 
the type of firm (large or small and young or old) and the industrial sectors they operate in 
and underscore the limited usefulness of the mean value.
Table 4 below reports the operating profit of firms by patent effectiveness. Since we 
constructed this table by matching CIS to the ARD2 data that contain information on gross 
value added, the number of firms in each column differs from that in Table 1. 
Table 4: Gross operating surplus and patent effectiveness (CIS / ARD2 surveys)
CIS3 CIS4 CIS5
Number 
of 
reporting 
units
Mean, 
mill. £
standard 
deviation, 
mill. £
Number of 
reporting 
units
Mean, 
mill. £
Standard 
deviation, 
mill. £
Number 
of 
reporting 
units
Mean, 
mill. £
standard 
deviation 
mill. £
Patents 
not used
3630 3.123 27.153 6729 6.433 57.630 3225 27.355 858.802
The 
importance 
of patents 
is low
180 5.726 19.800 697 12.647 52.069 439 16.362 81.236
The 
importance 
of patents 
is medium
193 10.890 4.659 559 13.451 63.212 301 26.739 181.640
The 
importance 
of patents 
is high
273 5.742 11.509 715 15.264 83.623 586 22.798 89.120
The mean value of the gross operating surplus for firms that use patent protection is higher 
than that for those that do not (although results for CIS3 and CIS5 suggest that the relationship 
between degree of rated importance of patents and size of gross operating surplus is not 
monotonic). This provides initial evidence that patent protection is related to the profitability 
of the UK firms.
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6. Estimating new product revenue from innovation and the patent premium
Appendix Table B2 shows the estimation results of the equation (1). For each CIS round we 
report the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results and Two-Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) 
results with 4th (or 3rd) lagged value of R&D as an instrument for one digit sectors. We also 
estimated the models using two digit sector controls but have not reported them in the 
appendix as the results were not very different. The range of a1d is between 0.49-0.91 and 
is statistically significant for all the three CIS waves. 
These results from estimating Model 1 suggest that one unit increase in patent effectiveness 
is associated with an increase in NPR of between 49% and 91% (depending upon which CIS 
round we use for coefficient values). Based on this information we can infer the implied 
increment to new product revenue due to patent protection as follows. In the CMU survey, 
average patent propensity is 28%, and for firms that do patent, patent propensity is 43%. 
Further, in the CMU measure, the patent effectiveness classes are defined as the share of 
innovations for which patents are effective in protecting the firm’s competitive advantage 
from innovation: less than 10%, 10-40%, 41-60%, 61-90%, over 90%. This suggests, and 
estimates in Arora et al. (2008) confirm, that classes 4 and 5 are very similar in terms of the 
implied behaviour of the firm. Thus, the CMU survey effectively only has 4 patent effectiveness 
classes, comparable to those in the CIS. 
Arora et al. (2008: fig 3) report that moving from the lowest patent effectiveness class to the 
second class increases patent propensity from about 10% to about 30%, the next move 
increases patent propensity to about 50%, the move from the third to the fourth class 
increases it to about 55%, and the move from the fourth to the fifth class leaves patent 
propensity largely unchanged. This implies that the average effect of increasing patent 
effectiveness from one class to the next, after weighting by the share of each class in the 
sample, is about 15%, i.e. a1 = 0.15. 
A second estimate of a1 can be obtained using the reported elasticity of 0.6 of patenting 
propensity with respect to patent effectiveness (measured as a continuous variable using the 
mid-points of the patent effectiveness classes) in an unpublished working paper by Arora, 
Ceccagnoli and Cohen (1999). The average patent effectiveness using the mid-points is 32% 
(which corresponds to patent effectiveness class = 2), a doubling of patent effectiveness is 
equivalent to moving to the third patent effectiveness class from the second. An elasticity of 
0.7 (evaluated at the mean patent propensity for firms that patent, of 43%) implies an increase 
in the patent propensity of 0.7 x 0.43 = 0.30. Thus, estimates of a1 range from a low of 0.15 
to a high of 0.30.
The patent premium (δ) is simply the estimated coefficient on patent effectiveness divided by 
a1. Thus, for a coefficient value of 0.61, δ is 2.0 if a1 =0.30, but 4.06 if a1=0.15. It should be 
noted that the patent premium resulting from model 1 relates to incremental new product 
revenues, rather than profits. Existing estimates of the patent premium reported in the 
literature typically relate to increment to profits rather than increments to new product 
revenues. Put differently, this estimate combines the direct effect from patents (of being able 
to exclude competitors and charge higher prices) and the indirect effects of investing in R&D 
and introducing new products. 
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Table 5a shows that patent premium varies from 1.63 to 6.06 depending on the estimated 
coefficient of patent effectiveness (which varies by the specification we use and, more 
importantly, by the CIS round), as well as the relationship between patent propensity and 
patent effectiveness. Excluding the extreme values, the implied range of the patent premium 
for new product revenues is between 1.63 and 3.87.
Table 5a: The patent (revenue) premium at different levels of patent propensity
Wave CIS3 CIS4 CIS5
Industry controls 1-digit 2-digit 1-digit 2-digit 1-digit 2-digit
a1δ 0.91 0.85 0.49 0.51 0.58 0.64
Coefficient of patent 
effectiveness on 
patent propensity 
(a1)
0.15 6.06 5.66 3.27 3.40 3.87 4.26
0.3 3.03 2.83 1.63 1.7 1.93 2.13
Note: Each cell represents the value of the patent premium for propensity given estimate of a1, the coefficient linking 
patent effectiveness and patent propensity, and based on coefficient estimates of patent effectiveness. The full 
estimates of the equations with 1-digit industry controls are reported in Table B2. The estimates with 2-digit controls 
are available on request. 
We consider two split samples – for large and small firms (estimates reported in Table 5b 
below) and for young and old firms (estimates reported in Table 5c below) across all three 
CIS waves, there were 610 small firms (defined by employment of 50 employees or less) and 
852 large firms (defined by employment of 250 employees or more). In estimating the split 
sample models we could not include controls for the CIS wave and for SIC at the same time. 
Thus the reported results control for CIS wave but not for the industry. The coefficient a1δ 
was 0.45 for small firms while for large firms the estimate of a1δ was 0.63. The implied patent 
premiums reported in Table 5b below range from 150% to 420%. Large firms clearly gain 
larger patent revenue premiums.
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Table 5b: The patent (revenue) premium at different levels of patent propensity 
(Model 1: split sample)
Firm type
Small
(≤50 employees)
Large
(>250 employees)
a1δ 0.45 0.63
Coefficient of patent 
effectiveness on patent 
propensity (a1)
0.15 3 4.2
0.3 1.5 2.1
Note: Each cell represents the value of the patent premium for propensity given estimate of a1, the coefficient linking 
patent effectiveness and patent propensity, and based on coefficient estimates of patent effectiveness reported in 
Table B3 below. 
Looking at the estimates for young and old firms we find again that older firms earn larger patent 
revenue premiums. The estimated coefficient of a1d is 0.46 for young firms and 0.66 for older 
firms - both results are statistically significant. The implied patent revenue premium then ranges 
from 153% to 440% with the premiums being higher for older firms. Again, we should interpret 
these results carefully as there are no industry controls in the estimation.
Table 5c: The patent (revenue) premium at different levels of patent propensity 
(Model 1: split sample)
Firm type
Young
(≤10 years)
Old
(>10 years)
a1δ 0.46 0.66
Coefficient of patent 
effectiveness on patent 
propensity (a1)
0.15 3.07 4.4
0.3 1.53 2.2
Note: Each cell represents the value of the patent premium for propensity given estimate of a1, the coefficient linking patent 
effectiveness and patent propensity, and based on coefficient estimates of patent effectiveness reported in Table B4. 
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We also split the sample by industry group and identified revenue premiums for six technology 
intensive industry groups, viz. biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, computer and electronic 
equipment, instruments, machinery and medical instruments.5 Unfortunately the numbers are 
small and the choice of lagged R&D as an instrument further restricts our ability to estimate our 
models corrected for endogenous R for all these sectors. We only report the OLS and 2SLS 
results for Model 1 in Table B8. 
Table 5d: The patent premium at different levels of patent propensity for broad sectors 
biotech
computer & 
equipment
machinery instruments
medical 
instruments
revenue premium (a1δ) 1.32 0.70 0.76 0.37 0.75
coefficient of patent 
effectiveness on patent 
propensity (a1)
0.15 8.8 4.7 5.1 2.5 5.0
0.3 4.4 2.3 2.5 1.2 2.5
Note: Each cell represents the value of the patent premium for propensity given estimate of a1, the coefficient 
linking patent effectiveness and patent propensity and based on coefficient estimates of patent effectiveness 
reported in Tables B8. 
The implied patent (revenue) premiums by sector (a1=0.15, 0.30) based on sector specific 
estimates of a1δ in Table B8 are reported in Table 5d below. The overall range of values 
reported here is higher than those in Table 5b, suggesting that these technology intensive 
sectors do gain from patenting. Biotech, Machinery and Medical Instruments show higher 
revenue premiums than computer and equipment or instruments.
7. Estimating profitability and patent premium
Table B5 shows estimates of the parameter a1g from the equation (6) in a system of simultaneous 
equations (6) and (7) – Model 2. We were unable to get estimates for CIS3 at the one digit level 
because the model did not converge but the value of a1γ is positive and significant for CIS4 and 
CIS5. It is 0.10 in CIS5 (2005-2006) and 0.096 in CIS4 (2000-2004). As before, we found the 
estimates with 1-digit and two digit industry controls to be fairly similar and have reported the 
full estimates only when we use industry controls at the one digit level. 
These results from estimating Model 2 suggest that one unit improvement in patent 
effectiveness is associated with an increase in gross operating surplus of an amount between 
7.3% and 10.4% (depending upon which CIS round we use for coefficient values). Based on 
this information we can simulate the impact of different patent propensities on the patent 
premium. This is shown in Table 6a below. As in the previous Model 1, we consider two 
values of a1. The patent premium (γ) is simply a1γ divided by a1. Thus, for a coefficient value 
of 0.096, γ is 0.32 if a1 = 0.30, but 0.64 if a1 = 0.15. Table 6a shows that patent premium (γ) 
varies from 0.32 to 0.67. These estimates are similar to those reported in Arora et al. (2008). 
5 The SIC codes corresponding to the industry groupings is as follows: Biotech and pharmaceuticals (SIC 241, 
244 &247); Computer and Electronic Equipment(SIC 300, 721,722, 723 & 724); Machinery (SIC 291, 292, 
295, 296, 341, 343 & 353); Instruments ( SIC 294, 332, 333, 334); Medical instruments (SIC 331) .
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They report that an average patent premium for US manufacturing in the early 1990s ranging 
from 0.67 (medical devices) to 0.38 (food and drink), with an average of about 0.47.6 
Compared with Table 5a the range of the patent premium in Table 6a is much tighter, as 
should be the case because Model 2 allows greater precision. However, we caution that the 
patent premium (γ) estimated here relates to the proportional increment to profit due to patent 
protection rather than the proportional increment to new product revenue. 
Table 6a: The patent (profit) premium at different levels of patent propensity (Model 2)
wave CIS3 CIS4 CIS5
industry controls 2-digit 1-digit 2-digit 1-digit 2-digit
a1γ 0.092 0.096 0.104 0.10 0.073
coefficient of patent effectiveness on 
patent propensity (a1)
0.15 0.61 0.64 0.69 0.67 0.49
0.3 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.24
Note: Each cell represents the value of the patent premium for propensity given estimate of a1, the coefficient linking 
patent effectiveness and patent propensity. Coefficient estimates of patent effectiveness are reported in Table B5 
with one-digit sector controls. 
We split the sample into two and ran the same estimations. Across the three CIS waves there 
were 330 small firms (<50 employees) and 822 large firms (>250 employees). These results 
are presented in Table B6. As before we were unable to control for industry and CIS wave at 
the same time. The estimate a1γ is 0.11 for small firms and 0.17 for large firms when controlling 
for which wave of CIS the observation came from. These results from estimating Model 2 
suggest that one unit improvement in patent effectiveness increases gross operating surplus 
of a small firm by 11% and of a large firm by 17% (depending upon which CIS round we use 
for coefficient values). As before, we simulate the implied patent premium. The Table 6b 
shows that patent premium varies from 0.37 to 1.13. 
We also split our sample into young firms (368 firms aged 10 years or less) and old (1391 
firms with age 11 years or more). The estimated results for a1g are 0.18 for young firms and 
0.07 for older firms. The implied profit premiums (derived in Table 6c) indicate that young 
firms gain more from patent protection than older firms do and the range of premium is 
between 23% and 120%. It is difficult to interpret this result without controlling for the industrial 
sectors to which these firms belong.
6 Arora et al (2008) distinguish between the conditional premium i.e. the premium for products that are patented, 
and the unconditional premium (including the premium that would have been earned by unpatented products 
had they been patented). Our focus here is on the conditional premium.
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Table 6b: The patent (profit) premium at different levels of patent propensity 
(Model 2: split sample)
Firm size
Small
(<50 employees)
Large
(>250 employees)
a1γ 0.11 0.17
Coefficient of patent effectiveness on patent 
propensity (a1)
0.15 0.73 1.13
0.3 0.37 0.57
Note: Each cell represents the value of the patent premium for propensity given estimate of a1, the coefficient linking 
patent effectiveness and patent propensity and based on coefficient estimates of patent effectiveness reported in 
Table B6 which do not include industry controls. 
Table 6c: The patent (profit) premium at different levels of patent propensity 
(Model 2: split sample)
Firm age
Young
(≤10 years)
Old
(>10 years)
a1γ 0.18 0.07
Coefficient of patent effectiveness on 
patent propensity (a1)
0.15 1.2 0.47
0.3 0.6 0.23
Note: Each cell represents the value of the patent premium for propensity given estimate of a1, the coefficient linking 
patent effectiveness and patent propensity. The table is based on coefficient estimates of patent effectiveness 
reported in Table B7 which do not include industry controls. 
8. New product revenue, profits and R&D 
The two models we have estimated also link patenting and R&D expenditures. Model 1 
allows us to assess the effect of R&D expenditure on NPR. Model 2 allows us to assess the 
effect of R&D on increase in profits and the implied effect of patent effectiveness on R&D. We 
report on these in turn.
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8.1. Elasticity of new product revenue to R&D (Model 1)
The elasticity of new product revenue to R&D (coefficient b1 from equation (1)) shows the 
impact of changes in the R&D expenditure on the revenue generated by products that are 
new to the market. As shown in Table B2, our point estimates for b1 vary between 0.04 and 
0.22 with one digit sector controls. However, when we estimate the same model at the two 
digit level the R&D coefficient disappears and we get estimated values that are insignificant 
and close to zero. The Arora et. al. (2008) study of the relationship between returns from 
innovation and R&D estimated this figure to be 0.66. We should note that the UK estimates 
relate all R&D by the firm to new products, while Arora et al (2008) relate R&D for innovative 
products to patentable innovations.
8.2. Elasticity of profits with respect to R&D (Model 2)
Table B5 estimates the parameter α (the elasticity of profits with respect to R&D). From the 
way the model is derived we expect α to lie between 0 and 1- that is we expect diminishing 
returns to R&D expenditure. The values of α we estimate are positive, and statistically 
significant at both one digit and two digit level but they are very sensitive to the definition of 
industries we use for estimation purposes. They vary from 0.17 CIS3 (two digit) 0.61 (CIS4, 
two digit estimates). When we split the sample into small and large firms in Table B6, we find 
α is positive and significant for both small (0.44) and large firms (0.13) although the lack of 
industry controls makes this difference hard to interpret. In the split sample by age of firm 
(see Table B7 in the appendix), the value of α is again positive and significant for both young 
and old firms but the difference is not statistically significant. The elasticity of profits with 
respect to R&D expenditure is 0.40 for young firms and 0.39 for the older firms. 
8.3. The implied elasticity of R&D due to patent protection (Model 2)
The most interesting finding, however, concerns the direct effect of patent effectiveness in 
inducing R&D. Equation (6) of our structural model enables us to compute the direct effect of 
patent effectiveness on R&D expenditures, since we have linearised the model, ER = β (a1 γ).
As noted earlier, a1γ is the composite coefficient of patent effectiveness estimated for CIS4 
and 5, and β =1/(1-α). Both of these coefficients are estimated jointly from equations (6) and 
(7), as explained above. Table 7 reports computed ER by CIS round.
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Table 7: The implied elasticity of R&D due to patent protection (Model 2)
CIS wave CIS3 CIS4 CIS5
industry controls 2-digit 1-digit 2-digit 1-digit 2-digit
parameters
β a1γ β a1γ β a1γ β a1γ β a1γ
1.21 0.092 2.23 0.095 2.56 0.104 1.97 0.10 2.56 0.073
ER 0.106 0.21 0.27 0.197 0.186
Table 7 shows that the implied % increase in R&D due to a higher level of patent effectiveness 
is 21% (in CIS4) and 20% (CIS5). These estimates are very close to the range reported in 
Arora et. al. (2008), whose results imply that an increase in perceived patent effectiveness 
from 2 to 3 (the median patent effectiveness in their data is equal to 2) is associated with an 
increase in R&D of 19.8% overall, with the largest increase in biotechnology and medical 
devices, and smallest in sectors such as textiles. 
We also estimated the values of ER for two split samples. Split samples estimate the implied 
elasticity of R&D due to patent protection by firm size and by firm age (Table 8 below). In 
Table 8, for both small firms and large firms the value of ER is about 19%.  The table also 
shows that the elasticity of R&D due to patent protection is much higher for the young firms. 
As before, these results control for the CIS wave the observation came from but we could not 
control for industry. A closer look at the data also indicates the small-sized establishments 
are often R&D units of larger enterprises and this is purely the consequence of matching to 
the BERD which picks up the larger R&D spenders in the economy.  Therefore it is difficult to 
infer much from these differences.
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Table 8: The implied elasticity of R&D due to patent protection by firm size and age 
(Model 2)
firm size small large 
parameters
β a1γ β a1γ
1.798 0.106 1.155 0.166
ER 0.19 0.19
firm size
young firms
(≤10 years) 
old firms
(>10 years)
parameters
β a1γ β a1γ
1.672 0.1810 1.650 0.074
ER 0.30 0.122
8.4 Summary and policy implications
This study aimed to assess the returns to patenting in the UK. We exploited the availability of 
matched micro-data to assess returns to patenting using a structural model of patenting and 
R&D. In this model, innovations depend upon the extent of R&D by the firm, and firms earn
higher returns on the patented portion of their innovations. We extend the model, allowing for 
R&D to respond to the higher profitability from innovation due to patent protection. Thus, the 
structural model developed by us allows the estimation of patent premiums (the incremental 
new product revenues and profits generated by patenting) and further, to measure the 
incentive that patent effectiveness provides for R&D expenditures. 
We find that patent premiums are positive and the prospect of patent protection provides 
inducement for R&D but the extent of premium and inducement to R&D varies by type of firm 
and industrial sector.  On average, a unit increase in perceived patent effectiveness is 
estimated to result in additional revenue from new products of about 160% to 200% and 
incremental profits of just over 32%. In addition, such an increase in patent effectiveness 
would bring forth an increase of  between 11 - 27% in R&D. These estimates must be treated 
with caution because they depend upon assumptions about the share of innovations that are 
patented, a quantity that we do not observe for the UK, forcing us to rely upon extrapolations 
based on US data. Patent incentives for large firms work as well in the UK as they do in the 
US, but may not be as strong for smaller firms. 
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The differences in industry composition between different CIS rounds have influenced the 
estimated values of returns. The markedly lower premiums in CIS4 and CIS 5 when compared 
to CIS3 are probably a consequence of the larger number of service sector respondents in 
CIS4 and 5. These sectors are known to rely less on patents and so are likely to have lower 
returns to patenting. 
We also reported product revenue premiums for a small range of sectors which may be 
thought of   as technology intensive. These results show very clearly that the range of revenue 
premiums in response to a unit increase in patent effectiveness for these sectors lies between 
230% and 510% - a much higher range of values than the 160-387% which we reported as 
the average range for all industries. Furthermore, we find (as have other studies) that revenue 
premiums are highest for the pharmaceutical and biotech sector and lowest for instruments. 
Computers and electronics, machinery and medical instruments occupy intermediate 
positions between these two extremes. These industry differences may also have some 
policy implications with regard to when strong IP may be vitally important for innovative 
growth.
Our ability to estimate patent premiums and R&D elasticity has been constrained by the 
availability of data - in particular the lack of information about what proportion of all innovations 
is patented. We also noted the sample selection biases introduced in our analysis when we 
use the 3rd and 4th lagged value of R&D as an instrument for R&D expenditures.
It should be emphasised that we have studied and tried to estimate only the private returns 
to patenting and the incentives they offer for R&D. We strongly recommend a re-design of the 
CIS questionnaires to overcome these types of constraints for researchers by including 
questions that clarify these issues.  In particular using lagged R&D values drawn from the 
survey would have been statistically more efficient.
Patenting may have other beneficial effects to which we do not impute any value in this work. 
Thus, we do not model the impact of patenting on R&D spill-overs. Nor do we consider the 
impact of patenting on entry and associated innovation. Conversely, we do not address the 
impact of patenting by other firms on the revenues or profits earned by the focal firm. Doing 
so would require more extensive information on the nature of competitive interactions 
between various firms. All of these are important issues that need investigation with better 
data – perhaps generated through a customised survey- but this was beyond the scope of 
the present work.
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Appendix A: Derivation of 
Models 1 and 2
Model 1
From the CIS we first create a measure of the total revenue from new products, NPR as follows7
NPR ≡ TR X % of revenues from new products (1.1’)
We consider as new products (N1) those products that are new to the industry - not just to the 
firm. We can get TR and % of revenue from new products from CIS or in case we want to 
construct a panel, we can get TR from ONS and the percentage of revenues from new 
products from CIS. 
NPR ≡ P1.N.Q1 (1.2’)
Where P1 = average price of new products, N = number of new products, and Q1 = average 
quantity of new products. 
We assume that
P1 Q1= PQ (1-Φ) + PQΦ(1+δ) (1.3’)
Where P is the price without patent protection and Q is the average quantity sold without 
patent protection. This equation says that the average revenue per product is a weighted 
average of revenue with and without patent protection, and that the revenue for patented 
items is greater (due to exclusivity from patents). Φ is the share of products for which patent 
protection was sought (patent propensity). 
Finally, we assume a production function linking the number of new product innovations to 
R&D investments, N = f(R). For the moment, we do not specify the functional form of f. Note 
that R is the R&D spent on product innovation, not total R&D. We will measure R as λ(Total 
R&D), where λ = share of R&D devoted to product innovation in the focal industry (from 
CMS), and Total R&D is taken from BERD or CIS.
7 For ease of exposition, we suppress firm and time subscripts. For this discussion, we also ignore process 
R&D and process innovation, because we lack measures of the impact of process innovation. (The measures 
in CIS are qualitative and do not facilitate analytical use.)
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Combining with (1.3’) and (1.2’), we get 
NPR = PQ (1 + Φδ) f(R) (1.4’)
Taking logs, and transforming the model into econometric form we get
npr = p + q + ln(1 + Φδ) + ln(f(R)) +εi (1.5’)
where lowercases denote natural logs.
Now, if we specify an appropriate form for f(R), we can estimate (1.5’) as a non-linear least 
squares For instance, if f(R) is Cobb-Douglas, (1.5’) and formula becomes 
npri = A + b1 ln(Ri) + ln(1 + Φδi) + εi (1.5’’) 
where, A = p+q +a. This is in fact, the eq (1) in Section 2.1.1.
Model 2
Write total profit Π = Qπ(R)(1-Φ + (1+γ)Φ) – C(R) (2.1)
Where C(R) = cost of R&D = mR, where we set the marginal cost of R&D = m, and π(R) is 
the operating profit per unit in the absence of patent protection, and Q is the total output. As 
before, Φ is the share of the focal firm’s products and services that are covered by patents, 
and γ is the patent premium. Note that in model 1, we had defined δ to be the patent premium 
in terms of the incremental profits from new products. Instead, here we define γ in terms of 
the incremental profits from all products and services, so that we can use the reported 
accounting profits as a measure of innovative performance (instead of new product revenues, 
as was the case in model 1). 
The first order condition for R is 
Qπ’(R) – m = 0 (2.1’)
Let Y = profits gross of R&D expenses. Setting π(R) = aRα, we get 
a Q(1+ Φδ) Rα-1 = 1 (2.1’’)
a Q(1+ Φδ) Rα = Y (2.2’’)
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letting β = 1/(1-α) and taking logs, we get 
LnR = β(Ln(a)) + βLnQ + β Ln(1+ Φδ) (2.1*) 
LnY = Ln(a) + LnQ + (α)LnR + Ln(1+ Φδ) (2.3*)
Now we assume that Ln(a) + LnQ is a function of firm and industry specific characteristics, 
ΣXj θj in equation (2.3*) and ΣXj λj in equation (2.1*) plus a constant term, C). 
Thus the estimating equations become 
LnR = C1 + ΣXj λj + β Ln(1+ Φδ) (eq1)
LnY = C2 + ΣXj θj + (α)LnR + Ln(1+ Φδ) (eq2)
where λj = βθj and β =1/(1-α)
These are eq. (6) and eq. (7) of Section 2.1.2.
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Appendix B: Other tables
Table B1: Summary statistics1 
CIS sample
Sample for which R&D lagged is 
available
CIS 3
Variable name1 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
npr, log 6340 1.04 3.31 515 3.33 5.44
npr, % 6451 1.92 10.02 519 5.03 14.84
GOS, 000£ 4276 3750.76 27409.49 410 11727.8 47718.88
GOS, log 4268 6.12 1.84 410 7.50 1.88
X 4276 0.32 0.83 527 1.27 1.32
R,  £000
(from CIS)
4276 81.87 1254.95 527 739.22 3158.89
R, £000
(mean R&D, BERD)
- - - 527 1883.55 7053.01
R, log 4276 0.45 1.46 527 5.63 1.70
# employees 4248 174.65 447.90 522 426.5 856.03
employees, log 4248 4.05 1.39 522 5.18 1.31
Global - - - - - -
Public 4276 0.86 0.35 527 0.99 0.08
Foreign 4276 0.06 0.24 527 0.19 0.39
cooperation 4276 0.04 0.20 527 0.20 0.40
R&D lagged , log - - - 527 5.38 1.85
CIS 4
npr, log 16085 1.53 3.91 1109 5.04 5.96
npr, % 16090 2.66 10.64 1110 8.29 17.64
GOS, 000£ 8700 8108.18 60214.79 772 14162.05 98760.07
GOS, log 8666 6.49 2.05 772 7.59 1.86
X 8700 0.46 0.93 1111 1.50 1.29
R,  £000
(from CIS)
8700 172.07 1834.76 1111 1065.8 4117.72
R, £000
(mean R&D, BERD)
- - - 1111 3245.57 22505.1
R, log 8700 1.07 2.03 1111 5.81 1.76
# employees 8698 365.36 1827.86 1110 329.21 671.0
employees, log 8698 4.02 2.05 1110 4.72 1.72
Global 8700 0.22 0.41 1111 0.62 0.49
Public 8700 0.87 0.34 1111 0.98 0.13
Foreign 8700 0.12 0.32 1111 0.25 0.43
cooperation 8700 0.07 0.26 1111 0.25 0.43
R&D lagged , log - - - 1111 5.58 1.89
1 Variables used in the study are at reporting unit level
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CIS 5
npr, log 4248 3.79 5.39 1205 6.36 5.86
npr, % 4249 5.57 13.86 1205 9.49 18.14
GOS, 000£ 4551 25667.73 72556.64 1232 17037.43 92568.69
GOS, log 4537 7.11 2.14 1232 7.57 2.04
X 4551 0.62 1.07 2608 1.04 1.27
R,  £000
(from CIS)
4551 217.26 1987.74 2608 584.66 4892.88
R, £000
(mean R&D, BERD)
2608 1844.39 23204.5
R, log 4551 1.22 2.19 2608 4.46 1.94
# employees 4547 504.46 1988.60 2595 256.78 680.21
employees, log 4547 4.57 2.06 2595 4.22 1.71
Global 4551 0.25 0.43 2608 0.43 0.49
Public 4551 0.92 0.28 2608 0.93 0.25
Foreign 4551 0.53 0.50 2608 0.54 0.50
cooperation 4551 0.06 0.24 2608 0.13 0.34
R&D lagged , log - - - 1031 5.45 2.00
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Table B2: Patent premium equation Model 1 
Dep. var:  NPR in 000s £, log CIS3 CIS4 CIS5
Estimation method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Patent effectiveness (a1δ)
0.90***
(0.19)
0.91***
(0.18)
0.50***
(0.14)
0.49***
(0.15)
0.58***
(0.21)
0.58***
(0.21)
R&D expenditure, log (b1)
0.19
(0.22)
0.14
(0.24)
0.02
(0.13)
0.04
(0.14)
0.04
(0.15)
0.22
(0.17)
Employment, log
-0.01
(0.25)
0.03
(0.27)
0.48***
(0.10)
0.48***
(0.12)
0.75***
(0.14)
0.67***
(0.16)
Global
1.48***
(0.38)
1.48***
(0.37)
1.10**
(0.54)
1.12**
(0.52)
Public
1.71**
(0.81)
1.77
(3.65)
0.25
(1.34)
0.24
(1.32)
-0.09
(2.14)
-0.26
(2.83)
Foreign
1.38*
(0.71)
1.40**
(0.62)
-0.73*
(0.43)
-0.74*
(0.42)
-0.82
(0.53)
-1.02*
(0.58)
Cooperation
1.81***
(0.67)
1.84***
(0.60)
2.42***
(0.43)
2.41***
(0.41)
1.00*
(0.55)
0.96*
(0.54)
Constant
-2.44*
(1.33)
-2.52
(6.36)
-0.75
(1.79)
0.16
(1.47)
1.01
(2.67)
2.72
(2.92)
Observations 512 512 1109 1109 588 588
R-square 0.113 0.112 0.131 0.131 0.152 0.150
F statistics 16.24 13.57
Wald test 64.0 167.0 107.0
First Stage Estimates:  Dep. variable:  R&D expenditure, log
Patent effectiveness
-0.07**
(0.03)
0.05***
(0.01)
-0.07**
(0.03)
Employment, log
0.15***
(0.02)
0.10***
(0.01)
0.15***
(0.02)
Global
-0.1
(0.07)
0.01
(0.04)
-0.10
(0.07)
Public
0.03
(0.42)
0.04
(0.15)
0.03
(0.42)
Foreign
0.11
(0.08)
0.10**
(0.04)
0.11
(0.08)
Cooperation
-0.04
(0.08)
0.20***
(0.04)
-0.04
(0.08)
R&D (3rd &4th lags)
0.81***
(0.02)
0.77***
(0.01)
0.81***
(0.02)
Constant
0.66
(0.43)
0.93***
(0.16)
0.66
(0.43)
Adj. R2 0.85 0.86 0.82
F stat instruments† 1106 3434 1468
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: *** - significant at 0.01; ** - significant at 0.05; * - significant at 0.1 Standard errors are in parentheses 
robust to heteroskedasticity. 1 digit Industry dummies are suppressed to safe space. † F –test for instruments: 
F(1,498)=1106 (CIS3); F(1,1095)=3434 (CIS4); F(1, 574)=1468 (CIS5). Instrument for R&D viz. the 3rd and 4th lagged 
values of R&D expenditure are taken from BERD. 
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Table B3: Patent premium equation Model 1 (split sample by firm size)
Dep. var:  NPR in 000s £, log Small firms Large firms Small firms Large firms
Estimation method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Patent effectiveness (a1δ)
0.42***
(0.13)
0.75***
(0.18)
0.45***
(0.15)
0.63***
(0.19)
R&D expenditure, log (b1)
0.070
(0.09)
0.39***
(0.13)
0.12
(0.16)
0.51***
(0.15)
Employment, log
1.27***
(0.10)
0.31
(0.32)
1.04***
(0.16)
0.12
(0.33)
Global
1.71***
(0.36)
0.90*
(0.53)
1.63***
(0.41)
0.93*
(0.56)
Public
-0.15
(0.56)
2.01
(1.82)
0.03
(1.15)
-0.63
(2.59)
Foreign
-0.64*
(0.35)
-0.37
(0.50)
-1.28***
(0.49)
-0.25
(0.51)
Cooperation
1.96***
(0.42)
1.34***
(0.48)
1.87***
(0.45)
1.38***
(0.50)
Constant
-2.17***
(0.74)
-4.12
(2.54)
-1.76
(1.48)
-0.96
(3.14)
No.obs 967 962 610 852
R-square 0.292 0.145 0.247 0.132
F statistics 80.35 20.22
Wald chi2 201.0 132.0
First Stage Estimates:  Dep. variable:  R&D expenditure, log
Patent effectiveness
-0.01
(0.02)
0.06***
(0.02)
Employment, log
0.01
(0.02)
0.19***
(0.03)
Global
-0.03
(0.06)
0.06
(0.06)
Public
0.24
(0.19)
0.08
(0.29)
Foreign
0.05
(0.08)
0.09*
(0.05)
Cooperation
0.11*
(0.07)
0.20***
(0.05)
R&D (3rd &4th lags)
0.76***
(0.02)
0.80***
(0.01)
Constant
1.01***
(0.24)
-0.04
(0.35)
Adj. R2 0.74 0.85
F statistics (1,600) 1410 3271
p-value 0.00 0.00
 
Notes: *** - significant at 0.01; ** - significant at 0.05; * - significant at 0.1 Standard errors are in parentheses 
robust to heteroskedasticity. Year 4 and year 5 dummies suppressed to safe space. † F –test for instruments: 
F(1,600)=1410 (small firms); F(1,600)=3271 (large firms). Instrument for R&D viz. the 3rd and 4th lagged values of 
R&D expenditure are taken from BERD.
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Table B4: Patent premium equation Model 1 (split sample by firm age)
Dep. var:  NPR in 000s £, log Young firms Old firms Young firms Old firms
Estimation method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Patent effectiveness (a1δ)
0.57***
(0.17)
0.68***
(0.10)
0.46**
(0.19)
0.66***
(0.11)
R&D expenditure, log (b1)
-0.03
(0.13)
0.12
(0.08)
0.02
(0.18)
0.20*
(0.10)
Employment, log
0.60***
(0.12)
0.52***
(0.07)
0.50***
(0.16)
0.37***
(0.10)
Global
2.64***
(0.49)
1.37***
(0.29)
2.75***
(0.58)
1.23***
(0.33)
Public
1.96**
(0.76)
1.09
(0.68)
2.58
(2.19)
-0.48
(1.30)
Foreign
-0.37
(0.49)
-0.49*
(0.29)
-0.52
(0.57)
-0.41
(0.34)
cooperation
1.85***
(0.52)
1.83***
(0.32)
2.04***
(0.53)
1.85***
(0.34)
Constant
-2.77***
(1.04)
-2.22***
(0.77)
-3.03
(2.35)
-0.28
(1.41)
No.obs 749 2077 556 1653
R-square 0.211 0.168 0.197 0.148
F statistics 28.08 52.58
Wald chi2 136.0 289.0
First Stage Estimates:  Dep. variable:  R&D expenditure, log
Patent effectiveness
0.07**
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
Employment, log
0.10***
(0.02)
0.10***
(0.01)
Global
0.09
(0.08)
-0.02
(0.04)
Public
0.31
(0.31)
0.04
(0.16)
Foreign
0.02
(0.08)
0.10**
(0.04)
Cooperation
0.15**
(0.07)
0.19***
(0.04)
R&D (3rd &4th lags)
0.74***
(0.02)
0.81***
(0.01)
Constant
0.75
(0.33)
0.49***
(0.17)
Adj. R2 0.81 0.84
F statistics (1,546) 1509 5975
p-value 0.00 0.00
 
Notes: *** - significant at 0.01; ** - significant at 0.05; * - significant at 0.1 Standard errors are in parentheses robust 
to heteroskedasticity. Year 4 and year 5 dummies suppressed to safe space. 
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Table B5: Patent premium equation of Model 2
Dep. variable:  Gross operating surplus
 (Y) in 000s £, log
CIS4 CIS5
Estimation method GMM GMM
Patent effectiveness (a1γ)
0.095**
(0.04)
0.101**
(0.05)
R&D expenditure, log (alpha)
0.551***
(0.05)
0.492***
(0.05)
Employment, log
0.318***
(0.05)
0.347***
(0.06)
Public
-1.083***
(0.34)
-0.230
(0.67)
Foreign
0.457***
(0.13)
0.781***
(0.15)
Cooperation
-0.051
(0.12)
0.181
(0.14)
Global
-0.295***
(0.11)
-0.249*
(0.13)
Constant
4.540***
(0.41)
3.143***
(0.71)
R&D equation Model 2
Employment, log
0.385***
(0.05)
0.383***
(0.07)
Public
0.710
(0.44)
0.112
(0.63)
Foreign
0.813***
(0.13)
0.739***
(0.16)
Cooperation
0.712***
(0.13)
0.687***
(0.17)
Global
0.186*
(0.11)
0.001
(0.15)
Constant
-1.674***
(0.53)
2.097***
(0.72)
Observations 771 583
Notes: *** - significant at 0.01; ** - significant at 0.05; * - significant at 0.1 1 digit SIC dummies and year dummies 
used as instruments are not reported to save space. Standard errors are in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table B6: Patent premium equation of Model 2 by firm size
Dep. variable:  Gross operating surplus (Y) in 000s £, log Small firms Large firms
Estimation method GMM GMM
Patent effectiveness (a1γ)
0.106*
(0.06)
0.166***
(0.03)
R&D expenditure, log (alpha)
0.444***
(0.07)
0.134***
(0.03)
Employment, log
-0.283***
(0.07)
1.024***
(0.07)
Public
-0.368
(0.72)
0.184
(0.61)
Foreign
0.668***
(0.21)
0.276**
(0.11)
Cooperation
0.088
(0.23)
0.200**
(0.10)
Global
-0.225
(0.17)
-0.240**
(0.11)
Constant
4.659***
(0.83)
0.812
(0.74)
R&D equation Model 2 (split sample)
Employment, log
-0.381***
(0.07)
0.988***
(0.09)
Public
0.363
(0.61)
-0.343
(0.31)
Foreign
0.608**
(0.24)
0.452***
(0.14)
Cooperation
0.609***
(0.21)
0.748***
(0.13)
Global
0.012
(0.18)
0.782***
(0.14)
Constant
5.007***
(0.61)
0.108
(0.61)
Observations 330 822
Notes: *** - significant at 0.01; ** - significant at 0.05; * - significant at 0.1 Year dummies are not reported to save 
space. SIC dummies are not included. Standard errors are in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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Table B7: Patent premium equation of Model 2 by firm age
Dep. variable:  Gross operating
 surplus (Y) in 000s £, log
Young firms Old firms
Estimation method GMM GMM
Patent effectiveness (a1γ)
0.181***
(0.06)
0.074***
(0.03)
R&D expenditure, log (alpha)
0.402***
(0.08)
0.394***
(0.03)
Employment, log
0.510***
(0.11)
0.465***
(0.04)
Public
-0.792
(0.65)
-0.287
(0.37)
Foreign
0.263
(0.18)
0.664***
(0.10)
Cooperation
0.032
(0.16)
0.059
(0.10)
Global
-0.589***
(0.20)
-0.471***
(0.09)
Constant
2.929***
(0.73)
2.910***
(0.41)
R&D equation Model 2 (split sample)
Employment, log
0.460***
(0.09)
0.392***
(0.04)
Public
0.643
(0.81)
-0.217
(0.33)
Foreign
0.560***
(0.21)
0.799***
(0.10)
Cooperation
0.384**
(0.19)
0.791***
(0.11)
Global
0.751***
(0.21)
0.220**
(0.10)
Constant
2.346**
(0.93)
3.332***
(0.39)
Observations 368 1391
Notes: *** - significant at 0.01; ** - significant at 0.05; * - significant at 0.1 Year dummies are not reported to save 
space. SIC dummies are not included. Standard errors are in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity. 
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Table B8: Top 5 sector by patent premium (Model 1)
Industry Biotech Computers & electronics Machinery Instrument
Medical 
instruments
Method OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Patent 
effectiveness (a1δ)
1.47***
(0.54)
1.32*
(0.70)
0.59*
(0.34)
0.70*
(0.39)
0.70***
(0.27)
0.76**
(0.30)
0.42
(0.37)
0.37
(0.37)
0.54
(1.01)
0.75
(0.81)
R&D expenditure, 
log (b1)
0.03
(0.41)
0.23
(0.54)
-0.16
(0.33)
-0.44
(0.50)
0.19
(0.21)
0.29
(0.25)
0.04
(0.42)
0.29
(0.45)
-0.89
(0.64)
-1.07
(0.84)
Employment, log 0.29
(0.48)
0.45
(0.60)
0.93***
(0.23)
0.91**
(0.37)
0.24
(0.20)
0.03
(0.26)
0.58
(0.43)
0.32
(0.47)
1.61**
(0.63)
1.74**
(0.68)
Global 2.66
(2.23)
1.68
(2.18)
1.03
(0.74)
0.74
(0.95)
2.71***
(0.83)
2.95***
(1.02)
-0.92
(1.43)
-1.14
(1.77)
-3.59
(2.26)
-4.22
(3.78)
Public -0.11
(2.96)
0.36
(3.27)
3.74***
(0.98)
3.45
(5.72)
Foreign 0.65
(1.72)
0.70
(1.71)
-2.02**
(0.85)
-2.34**
(1.17)
-0.19
(0.74)
0.12
(0.81)
1.31
(1.10)
1.57
(1.10)
1.83
(1.67)
2.24
(1.81)
cooperation 2.06
(1.80)
2.05
(1.61)
2.53***
(0.91)
2.80**
(1.13)
1.89**
(0.85)
2.17***
(0.84)
2.51**
(0.89)
2.18**
(0.89)
2.21
(1.89)
3.01*
(1.58)
Constant -2.17
(2.85)
-4.19
(3.36)
-0.25
(3.54)
1.12
(3.99)
-3.91**
(1.86)
-3.32
(5.98)
-1.01
(1.71)
-1.13
(1.75)
0.94
(3.45)
0.41
(3.80)
No.obs 73 63 225 174 317 269 164 151 41 37
R-square 0.35 0.35 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.26 0.27 0.34 0.44
First Stage Estimates: Dep. variable: R&D expenditure, log
Patent 
effectiveness
0.05
(0.07)
0.08**
(0.04)
0.02
(0.03)
0.09**
(0.05)
0.12
(0.08)
Employment, log 0.00
(0.06)
0.14***
(0.03)
0.09***
(0.03)
0.25**
(0.05)
0.12*
(0.06)
Global -0.08
(0.23)
0.05
(0.10)
-0.24**
(0.11)
-0.30
(0.22)
0.03
(0.38)
Public 0.29
(0.37)
-1.04*
(0.64)
Foreign 0.12
(0.17)
0.25**
(0.13)
0.06
(0.09)
-0.05
(0.14)
-0.31*
(0.18)
Cooperation 0.46***
(0.16)
-0.07
(0.13)
0.14
(0.09)
0.17*
(0.11)
0.48***
(0.15)
R&D (3rd &4th lags) 0.86***
(0.04)
0.67***
(0.03)
0.85***
(0.02)
0.66**
(0.04)
0.83***
(0.07)
Constant 0.74**
(0.33)
1.20***
(0.43)
1.41**
(0.67)
0.50**
(0.21)
-0.35
(0.40)
Adj. R2 0.85 0.64 0.83 0.67 0.83
F stat 
(instruments) 312.11 298 1282 292 145
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: *** - significant at 0.01; ** - significant at 0.05; * - significant at 0.1.  One digit industry dummies for Top5 industries 
as well as year dummies for (CIS4 and CIS5 waves) are not reported to save space. Standard errors are in parentheses 
robust to heteroskedasticity. Sector composition: Biotech and Pharma (SIC244, 241, 247); Computer and Electronics 
(SIC721, 723, 724, 300, 722); Machinery (SIC343, 292, 295, 341, 353, 296, 291); Instruments (SIC294, 332, 333, 334); 
Medical instruments (SIC331).
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